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ARE WE MORALLY OBLIGATED
TO MAKE GIFTS OF OUR
BODIES?
Thomas H. Murray, Ph.D.f
"D O WE OWN our own bodies" is not a silly question; ProfessorCalabresi has convinced us of that.1 But neither is it a simple
question, or even a single question. Rather it is several different
questions: about the moral status of the human body; about the re-
lations of persons to their bodies; about the needs of others, our
moral obligations, and the proper limits of the state's coercive
powers.
In the course of his argument, Professor Calabresi presents us
with ideas that are novel, even at times startling. This should be no
surprise: Guido Calabresi is one of the most original and creative
thinkers of our time; he is one of those rare scholars whose work is
unfailingly worth careful study, and his article "Do We Own Our
Own Bodies" is no exception.
Professor Calabresi begins his reflections with the case of Mc-
Fall v. Shimp2, in which a man needed a bone marrow transplant,
without which he would die. The only suitable donor at the time
was his cousin. The cousin, fearing the procedure, refused to do-
nate his bone marrow. The man needing the bone marrow sued for
an injunction to order his cousin to give it to him. The court would
not force the cousin to become a marrow donor3 .
Professor Calabresi reaches three conclusions in his article, all
t Professor of Biomedical Ethics and Director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics,
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Medical Humanities Review, and is on the editorial boards of Social Science in Medicine, and
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1. Calabresi, Do We Own Our Bodies?, 1 HEALTH MATRIX: CASE W. Rrs. J.L. MED.
(1991). Address by Dean Guido Calabresi, 1990 Case Western Reserve University Oliver
Schroeder Scholar-in-Residence Lecture (April 3, 1990).
2. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (1978).
3. Id.
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relating to the law as it is, or as it should be: that the court decided
correctly the case at hand;4 that a law requiring people to give mar-
row would not be obviously unconstitutional (if its obligations fell
on us all and not just "outsiders")5; and that legislators-and the
rest of us-ought to give more thought to this apparently outland-
ish idea.6 What legislators should not do is pass a law that would
burden primarily the already burdened or benefit primarily the al-
ready well off.
Of the first two issues7 I have nothing to say, being an ethicist,
not a legal scholar. The third issue was a response to the question
of whether a law stating that our body parts belong to those who
need them rather than to those who possess them is constitutional
and whether the legislature should permit this.8 This raises some
very interesting moral questions which I will explore.
At this time we have no legal obligations to give our body's
parts or products to another; but might we have moral obligations
to do this? The answer surprises even me: Yes, under certain cir-
cumstances we may have moral obligations to give body parts or
products to another. This is a very controversial claim, so let me
begin defending it with a discussion of some examples.
In recent months, two dramatic part-organ donations have
made the news. In one instance, a mother gave a lobe of her liver to
her child.' It is known that the liver can regenerate itself, so the
mother may not suffer any long-term harm from her donation,
although the pain and risk of the procedure should not be made
light of. This procedure was experimental, meaning no one could
say with confidence whether the child would benefit from it. The
hope, apparently, is that the child's immune system would accept
the mother's liver as a close antigenic match, and that the liver
might grow with the child. In the other, even more recent case, a
mother donated a part of her lung to her child.10 This too was very
4. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 3.
5. Id. at 11-12.
6. Id. at 18-26.
7. "First, was the court correct in its view of precedent? Was it, in fact, the case that
the court did not have the authority to order donation of the bone marrow to be given?
Second, even if it was correct in terms of precedent, what about the constitutional issue?
Would it be constitutional for the state to order us to give our body parts ot those who need
them?" Id.
8. Id. at 3.
9. Steinbrook & Shryer, Mother Gives Child Part of Liver in Historic Surgery, L.A.
Times, Nov. 28, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
10. Steinbrook, Lung Transplant - Taking Risks to Save a Life, L.A. Times, Oct. 29,
1990, at 3, col. 1.
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much an experiment, with no benefit assured and with risks to both
participants. Let us ask the skeptical question: Should parents
even be permitted to do such a thing? Most people, I suspect, would
say of course, if a child were gravely ill and there was something,
even though risky and painful, that a parent might do to save him
or her, the parent should be allowed to do it. What reasons would
we give to defend our choice to make such a gift? In the "liberta-
rian, individualistic, and autonomistic" culture we inhabit (so Pro-
fessor Calabresi describes it), many are quick to cite a right to
control one's own body, perhaps grounded on a legal right to pri-
vacy. Can we offer a different defense? Could we say that our obli-
gations to our children require sacrifices of many kinds? Giving a
piece of an organ (or blood, or marrow) seems dramatic perhaps,
but not so different in kind from other things we are asked to do for
our children's benefit. Should others not be permitted to interfere
with our fulfilling our moral obligations to our children?
The problem with talking about moral obligations in the two
examples just cited is that it is hard to imagine saying that any par-
ent is obliged to participate in such risky, desperate, long-shot at-
tempts. But suppose that the costs of helping-the pain and risks-
were reduced to a minimum, and that the potential benefits were
made vastly more probable and no less significant: might we then be
willing to say that parents can indeed have a moral obligation to
give some body part or product if it will almost surely save their
child's life?
Suppose that a small amount of a parent's blood could be
processed and used to supply a missing component of a child's im-
mune system, that this was very likely to be life-saving, and that the
risks to the parent were trivial. In these circumstances, does the
parent have a moral obligation to give that blood in order to save
the child's life? Most of us would agree that parenthood carries
with it many obligations intended to assist children's favorable de-
velopment into healthy, responsible, loving, and energetic adults. It
is not at all clear that giving blood is any more onerous or any less
morally obligatory than keeping vigil by a child's bed in sickness, or
getting up in the middle of the night to feed or change them, or to
console them when they are terrified by a dream. Good parents do
such things, and the failure to do them seems more than just miss-
ing an opportunity to go above and beyond the call of duty-what
philosophers call supererogation. It strikes us as a moral lapse, a
failure to do what is our duty.
Parents have a range of moral obligations. We do not require
1991]
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them to do what is impossible or futile, nor do we require them to
sacrifice completely their own interests or the interests of others for
the sake of their children. But we do expect them to accept minor
inconveniences and even a little pain if their children might benefit
enormously from it.
Does the fact that this act of parental caring involves the par-
ents' own bodies make it different from other kinds of moral obliga-
tions to our children? I can find no good reason to think that it is
all that different. Invoking a right to privacy is not a sufficient re-
joinder. For one thing, the right to privacy is usually taken as a
legal claim, something that imposes strict limits on what the state
may do. The claim is that the state may not interfere with the deci-
sions one makes about one's own body; not that every such decision
made is morally the best or right one. The right to privacy encom-
passes the right to make my own moral choices, including mistakes.
The discussion here is about the moral character of such deci-
sions-not about the state's prerogatives to impose its moral views
on us and our bodies.
At this point I must confess to a possible inconsistency. On the
one hand, I am arguing that people at times may have moral obliga-
tions to give parts or products of their bodies, yet I also believe that
certain body parts, in particular transplantable organs, should not
be sold. The key to this apparent paradox lies in a little joke made
by Professor Calabresi which begins with a paraphrase of Marx:
"From each according to his ability, to each according to his utility
functions."'" (What Marx actually said was: "To each according to
his need," but lawyer-economists have taught us that that is too
vague, and that we should prefer, what sounds like, more precise
terminology.) 2Unless you are indeed a particular breed of lawyer-
economist, or otherwise accept the claim that all desires are on
equal footing, and there are no such things as needs, you will notice
a difference between, the desire for a more powerful and expensive
sports car and the need for life-saving bone marrow.
We do not have to believe that there is a simple definition of
need that clearly marks off all those things that are mere desires and
all those that count as genuine needs to accept that there are some
things people should have without question, and other things that
we may leave to other distributional mechanisms such as the
market.
11. Calabresi, supra note 1, at 3-4.
12. Id. at4n. 8.
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There is good reason to believe that needs are relative to history
and culture. In a traditional farming community, children may not
have needed to become literate, but they surely needed to learn how
to farm. When most things physicians did were as likely to harm as
help, it made little sense to say that people had a "need" for their
services. In the U.S. today, access to good health care can make an
enormous difference in our lives, and it makes sense to describe at
least certain forms of health care as meeting needs and not merely
catering to desires.
Needs can be met in many ways. In the U.S., a modified and
supplemented market distributes most goods, including those that
meet needs for food, shelter, clothing, health care, and education.
We do not worry if we learn that not everyone has a VCR, because
the market is accepted as a way of distributing such a commodity.
On the other hand, we worry a great deal if everyone who needs a
life-saving organ transplant cannot get one, and we would worry a
great deal more if we learned that the wealthy got the organs sup-
plied by the poor.
A market in organs is problematic for two reasons. First are the
distributional consequences. Certain inequalities are tolerated in
the name of particular concepts of justice, or liberty, or other val-
ues. But stark life-and-death inequalities in which disfavored
groups once again bear most of the burdens, and reap few of the
benefits, violate important values about equal treatment and equal
regard. Second, the human body, in its symbolically significant
manifestations, has long been treated in the Anglo-American tradi-
tion as something that should not be bought and sold. The human
body deserves to be treated with a dignity which VCRs and sports
cars do not. 13
In the past, courts have had to deal with conflicts over dead
bodies. For example, in Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Ceme-
tery14 the court ruled that a dead body was "quasi-property" to
which certain persons may have rights, as they have duties to per-
form towards it arising out of our common humanity. But the per-
son having charge of it cannot be considered as the owner; he holds
it only as a sacred trust for the benefit of all who may from family
or friendship have an interest in it. 15
Prosser and Keaton offer this acerbic opinion about such cases:
13. Murray, On the Human Body as Property: The Meaning of Embodiment, Markets
and the Needs of Strangers, 20 J. oF LAw REFORM 1055 (1987).
14. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227 (1872).
15. Id at 242-243.
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the courts have talked of a somewhat dubious "property right"
to the body, usually in the next of kin, which did not exist while
the decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, can be used only for
the one purpose of burial, and not only has no pecuniary value
but is a source of liability for funeral expenses. It seems reason-
ably obvious that such "property" is something evolved out of
thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality the personal
feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction likely
to deceive no one but a lawyer.
Judges had to find some rubric in the law under which they could
treat conflicts over the disposition of dead bodies. "Property,"
whatever its unhelpful connotations in dealing with human bodies
and their parts, does provide a conceptual scheme permitting such
conflicts to be resolved. Prosser and Keaton help by underlining
the shortcomings of the "body as property" metaphor. However,
they may misdirect us by asserting that the only important value
being protected is the feelings of survivors.
Every culture has had to deal with the question of how to regard
and treat their dead. The answers have not all been the same, but
each answer seems to be in keeping with that culture's general atti-
tude towards our embodiment-that is, that we only know of our-
selves and each other in and through our bodies-and each culture
seems to regard it as an important question. Our culture acts as if it
believes that dead bodies deserve to be treated with dignity, not left
exposed to the elements or predators, as the ancient Persians are
said to have done. 7
Given our beliefs about the moral significance of dead bodies,
we do not permit them to be bought and sold, nor do we allow their
organs to become commodities. Likewise, we forbid markets in or-
gans such as kidneys from live donors. Our prohibitions go only so
far. For example, There are no objections to someone selling their
nail clippings or hair. We even permit people to sell their blood or
plasma. Perhaps this is an anomaly, or perhaps it is our view that
the sale of such replenishable substances that can be obtained with
minimal risk and inconvenience does not threaten the dignity of the
body.
Over the years there has been a remarkable transformation of
the system in this country for obtaining whole blood. In the 1960s
we assumed that people had to get something before they would
part with their blood, so we offered them money or some assurance
16. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 63 (W. Keeton 5th ed.
1984).
17. L. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 297 (1985).
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that they would get blood if they ever needed it. But we discovered
that we could get all the blood we needed-millions of units a
year-by being organized enough to provide two things: the infor-
mation that blood was needed, and a reasonably convenient oppor-
tunity to donate. People in sufficient numbers recognized the need,
and felt that they should respond to it. We do not ban the sale of
blood. In fact we would probably think that anyone who donated
their blood to a company that used it to make a profit was being
naive. But we have organized our whole blood supply-the blood
that most directly meets needs-as a not-for-profit system of gifts
among strangers.
In the case of blood, for many people the needs of others become
the grounds of moral obligation. Michael Ignatieff, an historian,
writes:
Need is a vernacular of justification, specifying the claims of ne-
cessity that those who lack may rightfully address to those who
have.... The pathos of need, like the pathos of all purely verbal
claims to the justice or mercy of another, is that need is power-
less to enforce its right. It justifies an entitlement only if the
powerful understand themselves to be obliged by it.18
When it comes to blood, bone marrow, or other body substances,
the "powerful" or at least "wealthy" are usually those who have an
adequate supply. Each year millions of such "powerful" people feel
the obligation strongly enough to share their abundance with
others.
If we are indeed the Marie Antoinettes and J. P. Morgans of
body parts, then it is because we have in abundance what others
need. Our selfish or indifferent hoarding of plenitude is open to the
same accusation levelled against them-that we should respond
generously to others' needs. We should not be surprised that the
accusation with respect to body parts is just now being first uttered.
Until the time that body parts or substances actually could assuage
another's need, it made no sense to accuse someone of withholding
that which could not benefit another. Only with the advent of safe
blood transfusions and with the growing variety of uses of one per-
son's tissues and body fluids to heal another's, is there this kind of
need for my body.
Understanding the need, and accepting that obligation follows,
does not mean that we must respond to every individual in need.
And it most certainly does not mean that the state is justified in
insisting that we satisfy such needs. But it does mean something.
18. M. IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 27 (1985).
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Suppose the facts of the case were a bit different than those
presented to the judge in McFall v. Shimp. Let us say that bone
marrow transplantation for the particular disease had advanced to
the state where, when a well-matching donor could be found, a
near-certain cure was the likely outcome and the alternative was
death. The reluctant could-be marrow donor was the patient's son,
whom the patient-father had raised lovingly and generously. The
marrow extraction procedure was virtually pain and risk-free. The
son, nonetheless, refused.
This son, I believe, has acted in an ungrateful and cowardly
manner. His father's impending death will be further blighted by
the knowledge that the son has failed to exhibit the moral virtues
the father had exemplified and tried to impart. He not only dies,
but dies believing that he failed as a parent, with his own preventa-
ble death the proof of that failure. The stuff of a good drama per-
haps, but a pitiful scenario.
Did the son in this case fail utterly to do his moral duty? As the
relationship between prospective donors and those in need grows
more distant and anonymous, the case for a strong moral obligation
becomes less compelling. Likewise, as the risk and inconvenience of
the donation increases, the probability of benefit diminishes, and the
danger to the recipient becomes less grave, the case for moral obli-
gation grows weaker.
This should not be surprising. Judgments of moral obligation in
complex circumstances share similar characteristics: a number of
relevant moral considerations of varying weight including the con-
sequences to the various parties, promises made, the strength and
intimacy of relationships, and the like. As the circumstances
change, judgments may become less certain until finally the balance
tips in the other direction. We are left with the question whether,
and in what circumstances, the law should support or enforce this
moral duty.
The law already supports the moral duty to give body parts to
others in need. It does so with whole blood by treating blood as a
service rather than a commodity, so that when someone is injured,
non-negligently, by the small though ineliminable risks associated
with transfusions, blood banks-and donors-are less likely to be
devastated by lawsuits. It does so with other tissues and whole or-
gans through the various statutes that permit donation from cadav-
ers and, occasionally, living donors. Laws such as these support
people's fulfillment of their moral duties, but do not force them to
do so.
[Vol. 1:19
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I describe this as a moral duty because if you attend to the rea-
sons people give for making such donations, they are frequently
couched in the language of obligation.19 Studies of living-related
kidney donors show that the decision to donate is most often made
immediately; people usually do not need a great deal of convincing
when a sister, brother, mother, father, or child needs a kidney.20
This is evidence that people recognize their moral duty to donate in
such circumstances.
What the law does not do, as least not yet, is enforce this partic-
ular set of moral duties. I want to explore briefly the reasons why
this may be so. Professor Calabresi offers the military draft as an
example of a situation where our bodies do not belong to us. In
such circumstances, it is true that we are not permitted to choose
whether to risk our lives. That decision is made, as Professor Cala-
bresi says, by the collectivity. But being made, involuntarily, to risk
our lives for the good of the community is not quite the same as
saying our bodies "belong to" the collectivity. The government
does not "own" our body. If the government did, then why
couldn't it auction off my limbs, organs, bones, and marrow? As I
understand it, soldiers on the battlefield can be ordered to give a
unit of blood. This does not seem to be an outrageous imposition
under those extraordinary circumstances. But I do not think that
we would allow a healthy soldier to be carved up, and his or her
organs distributed to several others in need of various parts, even if
under the ethics of triage more fighting men and women could be
put back into combat this way. The collectivity, or government, or
Army does not own our body in this way. It may compel us to run
grave risks, but it may not chop us up, even for good reasons.
We draw a thick but not impenetrable line at the body's perime-
ter. We may expose your body to risks, but we are loathe to punc-
ture the boundary of your skin. We hesitate to make you accept
drugs or medical treatments against your will. The exceptions we
permit are usually justified by arguing that you are not old enough
or sane enough or conscious enough (or free enough?) to refuse
something that would help you. When you will not be helped by
whatever body boundary crossing we propose, as for example in
nontherapeutic research, voluntariness becomes an almost absolute
principle.
19. R.M. TrrMus, THE GIFr OF RELATIONSHIP (1971).
20. R. SIMMONS, S. KLEIN, R. SIMMONS, GIFT OF LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHO-
LOGICAL IMPACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION (1977).
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One reason we are loathe to countenance the taking of body
parts is the powerful belief most people have that their bodies-
even if they do not "own" them like they own their car or house-
are profoundly theirs, and no one else's to appropriate. We may
decide in time that this belief is wrong or unhelpful, but before we
discard it we should ask from where this deep conviction comes and
what purposes it serves.
Whatever its source, the idea that our physical body is a crucial
moral boundary is widespread and potent. Violating that boundary
with state sanctioned coercion evokes indignation and staunch
resistance. Until people are willing to accept that they have a moral
obligation to give body parts to others in need, a law forcing them
to do so would be very costly-inspiring rampant disobedience and
mistrust.
The benefits of a system of gifts of the body, in contrast, are
subtle but far-reaching. Gifts of blood, other tissues, and organs
attest to our connectedness with one another, our shared embodi-
ment, and our always tenuous and threatened grasp on health. Es-
pecially in large impersonal societies where bureaucracies mediate
between my resources and the needs of others, gifts of the body are
a symbolically rich way to reaffirm the value of solidarity, that we
are, in fact, members of one community, responsive to one another's
needs.21
I contend that there can be circumstances in which we have
moral obligations to give parts of our bodies to others. These moral
obligations will grow more visible and compelling as the likely bene-
fits to others grow more dramatic and certain and the risks to do-
nors become minimal. This does not justify laws forcing us to fulfill
those moral duties, at least not yet. We have too much to lose by
such coercive policies, both in the costs they would inflict, and the
lost opportunities for reinforcing solidarity.
Professor Calabresi's paper could be taken as proof that the met-
aphor of "ownership" for our relationship to our own bodies is in-
adequate and misleading. I agree completely. Our relationship
with our bodies is both less and more than commercial ownership.
We cannot (and should not) alienate our body parts (no "kidney
futures" markets). We may be commanded to expose them to risks
when community survival is at stake. Yet others are forbidden not
only to take but even to touch our bodies without our permission.
21. Murray, Gifts of the Body and the Needs of Strangers, HASTINGS CTR. REP. 30, 35
(April 1987).
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For the Marie Antonettes and J. P. Morgans of body parts
among us, there may be times when we have a moral obligation to
share our plenitude with others less fortunate. As these occasions
become more common, and as the conviction grows that such moral
obligations are sensible and real, a law compelling donation be-
comes less outrageous. But I wonder if, even then, such a law
would be wise. Would it not be better to support a system built on
gifts and the values of community and solidarity, as long as it came
near meeting the need? We might have little to gain, and a great
deal to lose, by transforming a gift inspired by positive social values
into a state-enforced burden. We shall pay a high price if there is
ever an IRS for body parts.

